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Similarity is a fundamental concept in cognition. In 1977, Amos Tversky published a
highly influential feature-based model of how people judge the similarity between objects.
The model highlights the context-dependence of similarity judgments, and challenged
geometric models of similarity. One of the context-dependent effects Tversky describes
is the diagnosticity principle. The diagnosticity principle determines which features are
used to cluster multiple objects into subgroups. Perceived similarity between items within
clusters is expected to increase, while similarity between items in different clusters
decreases. Here, we present two pre-registered replications of the studies on the
diagnosticity effect reported in Tversky (1977). Additionally, one alternative mechanism
that has been proposed to play a role in the original studies, an increase in the choice
for distractor items (a substitution effect, see Medin et al., 1995), is examined. Our
results replicate those found by Tversky (1977), revealing an average diagnosticity-effect
of 4.75%. However, when we eliminate the possibility of substitution effects confounding
the results, a meta-analysis of the data provides no indication of any remaining effect of
diagnosticity.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1977, Amos Tversky published a highly influential paper on
features of similarity. He critiqued geometric models of similar-
ity, and proposed an alternative approach known as the contrast
model. Tversky’s contrast model is built on feature matching
processes where similarity judgments are based on the contrast
between common and distinctive features of two stimuli, and
where the salience of these features is, among other things, depen-
dent on the context. The diagnosticity principle, the focus of the
current replication project, is one of the mechanisms through
which similarity judgments become context-dependent.
Tversky (1977) argues that the salience of features is deter-
mined by intensive and diagnostic factors. Intensive factors are
those that increase the intensity of the feature, such as size, bright-
ness, and clarity. Diagnostic factors are context-dependent and
refer to the importance based on those features. Tversky illus-
trates the diagnosticity of features with the following example:
“the feature ‘real’ has no diagnostic value in a set of actual ani-
mals since it is shared by all actual animals and hence cannot be
used to classify them. This feature, however, acquires considerable
diagnostic value if the object set is extended to include legendary
animals, such as a centaur, a mermaid, or a phoenix” (Tversky,
1977, p. 342).
When people sort sets of objects into sub-sets or clusters, these
clusters are usually created such that they maximize similarity of
objects within the cluster and dissimilarity of objects between the
clusters. Because the addition of other items to a set of objects can
alter how people sort objects into clusters, the diagnostic value
of features on which these clusters are based will change depend-
ing on the overall context. This will in turn influence the judged
similarity between objects that share these diagnostic features.
According to Tversky’s diagnosticity principle, features that are
used to cluster stimuli into subgroups have a higher diagnostic
value and will therefore affect similarity judgments more than fea-
tures that are not used to create clusters. Features shared within a
cluster will increase the similarity between objects in that clus-
ter, whereas features that differ across clusters will decrease the
similarity between objects from different clusters.
The diagnosticity principle is especially relevant when peo-
ple are asked how similar two stimuli are, and the question
does not specify any specific feature space to base the similarity
judgment on. Tversky’s model of similarity is a major contri-
bution to the field of psychology, and even though follow-up
research has expanded upon the model (see for example Gentner
and Markman, 1997), the main premises of the model are still
accepted today, as indicated by the large number of citations (6242
in Google Scholar as of June, 2014). In other words, Tversky’s
paper led to a fundamental change in how scientists think about
similarity judgments (for a discussion, see Goldstone and Son,
2005). The diagnosticity principle is especially interesting for psy-
chologists, because it revealed how geometric models of similarity
failed to take into account that human cognition is inherently
context-dependent. It is the context that determines how different
features of stimuli are weighed in similarity judgments.
Tversky’s diagnosticity principle contributed to what is cur-
rently understood to be a basic principle of similarity judgments.
It is therefore remarkable that only a modest number of stud-
ies have tried to (conceptually) replicate the diagnosticity effect.
Furthermore, whereas the original studies have yielded clear
results, follow up studies do not allow unequivocal conclusions.
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All the replication attempts either test the diagnosticity effect
in a different way (which makes it difficult to compare effect
sizes between studies), or suffer from methodological or data-
analytical problems. Therefore, there is a general imbalance
between the theoretical importance of the diagnosticity effect,
and the amount of empirical support for its existence.
STUDIES ON DIAGNOSTICITY: Tversky (1977)
Tversky reports two different studies that provide support for the
diagnosticity effect. The first study reported in Tversky (1977)
uses a straightforward paradigm. First, participants were shown
a group of four faces (see Figure 1, below).
This group of faces always consisted of a neutral (a, the target
stimulus on the top), frowning (b), and smiling (c) face. For half
of the participants (condition 1) the fourth face was smiling (p),
for the other half (condition 2) it was frowning (q). Participants
were asked to split the four faces into two groups of two faces.
As expected, when the fourth face was smiling most participants
grouped c&p (smiling) and a&b (non-smiling), but when the
fourth face was frowning participants grouped b&q (frowning)
and a&c (non-frowning).
According to the diagnosticity principle, smiling vs. non-
smiling had a greater diagnostic value in the first set of faces,
FIGURE 1 | Stimuli used in Experiment 1 (Tversky, 1977).
but frowning vs. non-frowning was a more diagnostic classifica-
tion feature in the second set of faces. Subsequently, a different
group of participants (N = 50) was asked to pick the face that
most resembled the target face (a) from a group of b, p[q], and c.
Mirroring the choices participants made when classifying the four
faces into two subgroups, participants were more likely to pick the
frowning face as most similar to the neutral target face when the
other two faces were smiling (condition 1), as compared to when
two of the three faces were frowning (condition 2, for the choice
proportions, see Figure 1). The reverse was true for the smiling
face, which was more likely to be picked as similar to the neutral
face a in condition 2 as compared to condition 1. The diagnostic-
ity principle was thus represented by the proportion selecting the
frowning face in condition 1 minus the proportion selecting the
frowning face in condition 2, as well as the proportion selecting
the smiling face in condition 2 minus the proportion selecting the
frowning face in condition 1.
Study 2 on the diagnosticity principle, (described in more
detail as Experiment 4 in Tversky and Gati, 1978) is a concep-
tual replication using semantic stimuli. Instead of using sets of
four faces, sets of four countries were used. First, an independent
group of participants was asked to classify the 4 countries into two
groups (although as opposed to Experiment 1, no longer neces-
sarily into two groups of two). Three countries were the same in
each condition (a, b, & c) but the fourth varied depending on
the condition (p/q). Instead of a single trial experiment (as in
Experiment 1), 20 sets of countries were created. After this cate-
gorization task, a new group of participants (N = 33) was asked
to make similarity judgments (as in Experiment 1, see Figure 2
for an example trial).
It was expected that similarity judgments would follow the
same pattern as the categorizations made by the previous
group of participants, and this pattern of results was indeed
observed. Whereas in Experiment 1 a single trial consisting
of novel and visual stimuli is used (i.e., schematic faces),
in Experiment 2 diagnosticity is based on existing, semantic
FIGURE 2 | Example of stimulus used in Experiment 4 (Tversky and
Gati, 1978).
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knowledge (i.e., characteristics of countries), and multiple trials
were used. Other than that, the experiments closely resemble each
other.
SUBSTITUTION EFFECT
A problem with these studies, as explained by Medin et al. (1995),
is that a change in choice proportion does not necessarily reflect
a diagnosticity effect but could also be the result of a substitu-
tion effect. The substitution effect is most often discussed in areas
of consumer choice when two goods have positive cross-elasticity
such as chocolate ice-cream and vanilla ice-cream. The intro-
duction of one item into the market (i.e., chocolate ice-cream)
reduces demand for the other item (vanilla ice-cream). Medin
and colleagues propose something similar may have occurred in
the studies by Tversky (1977) if it was the case that the distractor
stimulus (the item varying across condition, p or q) drew more
choices away from one option than from the other.
This may be easiest to illustrate with a (hypothetical) exam-
ple shown in Figure 3. Imagine that in the population 50% of the
people believe that a neutral face (see Figure 3) is most similar
to a frowning face. The other 50% believe it is most similar to
smiling face. In condition 1, this means that 50% of the partici-
pants judge face b (frowning) is most similar to face a (neutral),
since face b is the only frowning face in the choice-set. The other
50% of the participants could spread their choice over face p
and face c since both those faces are smiling. In condition 2,
50% of the participants would judge face c as most similar to
face a since it is the only smiling face. The remaining 50% of
the participants could spread their choices over both face b and
face q, both of which are frowning. As a result, choices differ
between condition 1 and 2, but this difference is not necessar-
ily because the inclusion of distractor face p/q changes similarity
judgments of face b or c, but merely because one group of
people (e.g., those who believe frowning is most like smiling)
spread their choices over two options. Differences in choice due
to substitution-effects would occur in the same direction as dif-
ferences predicted on the basis of a diagnosticity effect. As a
result, it is unclear whether the data provided by Tversky (1977)
is truly evidence for a diagnosticity effect or merely represents
substitution-effects.
Substitution effects can be eliminated by ranking the choice-
options rather than selecting from them (Medin et al., 1995).
To reiterate, the diagnosticity-principle would predict that in
Figure 3 the inclusion of a smiling face (p) would increase the
perceived similarity between the frowning face (b) and the neu-
tral face (a). Inclusion of a frowning face (q), would increase
perceived similarity between the smiling face (c) and the neutral
face (a). A substitution effect predicts that inclusion of a smiling
face (p) draws choices away from the other smiling face (c), but
crucially, does not predict that people would perceive the frown-
ing face as (b) more similar to the neutral face (a). As such, both
a substitution-effect as well as a diagnosticity-effect would result
in a relative increase in choices for b in condition 1 as compared
to condition 2. However, only a diagnosticity-effect would result
in b being ranked above c more in condition 1 as compared to
condition 2.
CLOSE AND CONCEPTUAL REPLICATIONS
Despite the straightforward experimental method and the the-
oretical influence the original experiments have had, there are
remarkably few replication attempts. Even more striking is
that all attempts we were able to find in the literature could
either not be directly compared with the original studies by
Tversky or had no strong evidential value for a diagnosticity
effect.
DIRECT REPLICATIONS
A literature search revealed one published close replication,
in which participants from two different cultures (China and
Australia) performed the original experiment (Zhou et al., 2005).
The results of this experiment are difficult to interpret, since
the number of participants selecting each item is not reported.
Furthermore, because the authors are interested in whether their
participants differ from Israeli participants, the crucial test for
the diagnosticity-effect (comparing choices in set 2 with choices
in set 1) is not reported. Instead, the authors test whether the
choice proportions by the Chinese and Australian participants
were different from each other, and different from Tversky’s
original results. The original authors have kindly provided the
choice-data which allow us to calculate whether a diagnosticity
FIGURE 3 | Illustration of substitution effect. In the situation below more people would choose the face on the left (b) in condition 1 as compared to
condition 2 because choices for a frowning face are spread over two options in condition 2.
www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 875 | 3
Evers and Lakens Revisiting diagnosticity
effect was found in their study. For the Chinese participants,
6/30 selected face b as most similar to the target in condition
1 and 7/30 participants selected face b in condition 2. This
difference is not significant, χ2(1, N = 60) = 0.10, p = 0.75. In con-
dition 2, 21/30 participants selected face c to be most similar
whereas in condition 1 this was only 14/30 participants. This dif-
ference was marginally significant, χ2(1, N = 60) = 3.36, p = 0.07.
For the Australians, 14/31 selected face b to be most similar
in condition 1 and 13/34 in condition 2. This was not signif-
icant, χ2(1, N = 65) = 0.32, p = 0.57. Furthermore, in condition
2, 21/34 selected face c to be most similar while only 14/31
did so in condition 1. This difference was also not significant,
χ2(1, N = 65) = 1.80, p = 0.18. Thus, whereas these data do indeed
show that choices differ across cultures, which was the claim of
the paper, they do not support the presence of a diagnosticity
effect.
The only other direct replications of Study 1 we know of are
two unpublished datasets collected by the second author. This
data was collected in an online adaptation of the original experi-
ment (as in Study 1b and Study 2b) as part of an assignment in an
introduction to psychology class (similar to the original studies by
Tversky) in 2012 and 2013. The sample sizes were relatively small
(2012: n1 = 45, n2 = 41, 2013: n1 = 63, n2 = 70, but the results
(available from http://osf.io/e6cr3/) were still insightful since the
null-effect was a trend in opposite direction of the hypothesized
(and previously found) effect. Given the lack of an effect in the
replication study, we should seriously consider the possibility that
Tversky’s (1977) effect-size is an overestimation.
CONCEPTUAL REPLICATIONS
A conceptual replication (Goldstone et al., 1997, Experiment 2A
and 2B) used schematic faces similar to those used by Tversky
(1977) with one extension. On some trials, the distracter and
one of the other two choice options shared a feature that did
not match the comparison stimulus (a shared mismatch), while
on other trials the distracter shared a feature that was also pos-
sessed by the comparison stimulus (a shared match, see Figure 4).
Because shared mismatches are likely to be categorized separately
from the target, these would be expected to decrease similar-
ity between the shared-mismatching items and the target item.
Shared matches are likely to be categorized together with the
target, and would therefore increase similarity. Goldstone et al.
(1997) report a difference in choice-proportions such that for
shared matches participants are slightly more likely to choose
the option that shares a feature with item a (the target item
portrayed on top) than the option not sharing a feature with
a (i.e., in Study 2a 50.8% chooses the option sharing a fea-
ture while 48.5% chooses the option not sharing a feature, while
in Study 2b 51% chooses the option sharing a feature while
48.5% chooses the option not sharing a feature in study 2b).
This effect is opposite from what would be expected on the basis
of a categorization-based diagnosticity account, but are in line
with a variability-based diagnosticity account proposed by the
authors.
The second conceptual replication, conducted by Medin and
Kroll (as discussed in Medin et al., 1995), used geometrical
shapes, and attempted to examine whether the diagnosticity effect
FIGURE 4 | Illustration of a shared-match and a shared-mismatch.
occurred above and beyond a substitution effect. Rather than
examining the change in choice-proportion, as done by Tversky
(1977), they count the number of trials in which the diagnostic
option (the option that shares a relationship with the target that
is not shared by the other options) is ranked as being more sim-
ilar to the target than one of the non-diagnostic options (using
the relative ordering task also used in the current studies), and
report the diagnostic option was selected in 55% of the trials
(chance would predict this to happen in 50% of the trials). This
result suggests that there is indeed a diagnosticity-effect beyond
substitution.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 875 | 4
Evers and Lakens Revisiting diagnosticity
OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STUDIES
As the preceding section illustrates, support for the diagnostic-
ity effect is mixed and limited. We know of six close replication
attempts. Of these six datasets, four are interpretable but fail to
find an effect (two datasets by the second author available from
http://osf.io/e6cr3/ and Zhou et al., 2005). The final two experi-
ments (Medin and Kroll in Medin et al., 1995; Goldstone et al.,
1997) do replicate a diagnosticity effect, but this effect is much
smaller than the original diagnosticity effect found by Tversky
(1977). These differences in effect size could be a consequence
of the differences in methodology, but it is also possible that
Tversky’s original findings are by large the result of a substitu-
tion effect misinterpreted as a diagnosticity effect. Because of the
importance of the diagnosticity effect, and the limited empiri-
cal evidence for it, we believe that the original work by Tversky
(1977) is an excellent candidate for replication. Therefore, we set
out to perform a pre-registered replication of both Study 1 and
Study 2 reported in Tversky (1977).
To examine the possibility of a substitution effect we extended
the original studies by adding questions after the original proce-
dure used by Tversky and Gati (1978), designed to distinguish
between the substitution effect and the diagnosticity effect. We
first asked participants to choose the most similar target in a close
replication of Tversky (1977), and subsequently used a ranking
task to distinguish between a diagnosticity effect and a substitu-
tion effect (cf. Medin et al., 1995). This means that it is possible to
successfully replicate the data pattern observed by Tversky (1977),
while concluding there is no evidence for a diagnosticity effect,
if the observed effect disappears after eliminating a substitution
effect.
We used larger sample sizes for more accurate estimates of
effect-sizes as well as to guarantee sufficient statistical power even
when the effect size reported is an overestimation of the true effect
size. Because the small number of replications does not provide
a reasonably accurate meta-analytical point-estimate for the true
effect size, we used at least 2.5 times the original N following rec-
ommendations in Simonsohn (2013), to have approximately 80%
power to detect an effect of the size the original studies had 33%
power to detect. This results in a minimum of 125 participants
in the categorization task for Study 1a and 1b, 250 participants in
the similarity task for Study 1a and 1b, 125 participants in the cat-
egorization task for Study 2a and 2b, and 175 participants in the
similarity task in Study 2a and 2b. Note that the categorization-
task itself is not a replication-study, but that categorization is
a necessary condition for the diagnosticity-effect to emerge. All
materials, data, and the replication-proposal can be found on the
OSF-framework: http://osf.io/e6cr3/. All analyses and exclusions
presented below were planned unless explicitly noted.
STUDY 1
Study 1 was a close replication of the first study on the diagnostic-
ity principle in Tversky (1977). In total two replications of Study
1 were performed. In Study 1a Dutch students from Eindhoven
University of Technology and Tilburg University performed a
paper and pencil version of the task. In Study 1b a computerized
version of the task was performed by an American popula-
tion of Amazon mTurk workers. For both replication studies
one group of participants performed the categorization task and




Categorization task. Two-hundred students from Tilburg
University were approached on campus to complete the cate-
gorization task. They were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions in which they saw the four original faces used by
Tversky(1977, see Figure 1) displayed on a horizontal line, and
were asked to assign the four faces to two different groups. Both
versions consisted of one neutral, one frowning and one smiling
face. In the first condition the fourth face was another (slightly
different) smiling face (p). In the second condition, the fourth
face was another (slightly different) frowning face (q). Placement
of the neutral face was counterbalanced between participants.
Similarity task. Two-hundred-fifty-four students from
Eindhoven University of Technology were approached on
campus and randomly assigned to one of two conditions in
which they were presented with four drawn faces (see Figure 1).
In both conditions, the face on top always had a neutral expres-
sion (a), the face on the left was always frowning (b) and the face
on the right was always smiling (c). The face in the middle of the
bottom row varied per condition. In condition 1 it was another
smiling face (p) while in condition 2 it was another frowning face
(q). On the first page, participants were asked to indicate which
of the faces on the bottom row was most similar to the face on
top (a), similar to Tversky (1977). Extending the procedure used
by Tversky (1977), on the second page participants saw the same
four faces and were asked to rank the faces on the bottom row
from most similar (#1) to least similar (#3) to the face on top.
Following Medin et al. (1995), this second question allows us
to distinguish between a diagnosticity effect and a substitution
effect.
Results
Categorization task. Similar to Tversky (1977), a large propor-
tion of the students (81/99, 81.8%) in condition 1 grouped the
smiling faces (p and c) together, and grouped the neutral face (a)
together with the frowning face (b). In condition 2, a large pro-
portion of the students (78/100, 78%) grouped the frowning faces
(b and p), and the neutral and smiling face (a and c) together.
Similarity task. Based on the results of the categorization task,
participants in condition 1 were expected to be more likely to
indicate the neutral face (a) being similar to the frowning face (b)
as compared to participants in condition 2, but this was not the
case (38/12, 29.9% in condition 1, 46/127, 36.2% in condition 2,
the diagnosticity effect was calculated by subtracting the choice-
proportion in condition 2 from the choice proportion in condi-
tion 1 resulting in a diagnosticity effect of −6.30%, χ2(1, N = 254) =
1.14, p = 0.29, Cramer’s V = 0.067. Similarly, participants in
condition 2 were expected to be more likely to indicate the frown-
ing face (c) to be more similar to the neutral face (a) as compared
to participants in condition 1, but this was also not the case
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(80/127 in condition 1, 81/127 in condition 2, diagnosticity effect
0.79%, χ2(1, N = 254) = 0.02, p = 0.90, Cramer’s V = 0.008.
Even though no significant effect was found, analyzing the
rank-orders instead of choice is a more accurate estimate of the
diagnosticity-effect. Therefore, and for consistency with the fol-
lowing three studies, we also calculated the diagnosticity effect
eliminating possible substitution-effects. To do this, we followed
the procedure by Medin et al. (1995), and recoded the rankings
into a dichotomous variable indicating whether the frowning face
(b) was judged to be more similar to the neutral face (a) than the
smiling face (c), or indicating that the smiling face (c) was more
similar to the neutral face (a) than the frowning face (b)1. 42/126
Participants2 in condition 1, and 46/127 participants in condition
2 judged the sad face (b) as more similar to the neutral face (a)
than the smiling face (c). Analyzing the data using rank-orders
also resulted in a non-significant diagnosticity effect of 2.89%,
χ2(1, N = 253) = 0.23, p = 0.63, Cramer’s V = 0.03. See Table 1 for
an overview of these results.
STUDY 1b
Method
Categorization task. One-hundred-and-fifty-five workers on
mTurk participated in this task in return for $0.10. They were
randomly assigned to one of two conditions in which they saw
four drawings of a face and were asked to assign them to two dif-
ferent groups, as in Study 1a. Placement of the neutral face was
counterbalanced between participants.
Similarity task. Two-hundred-and-two workers on Amazon
mTurk participated in this task in return for $0.16 and were ran-
domly assigned to one of two conditions3. As in Study 1a they
were presented with four drawn faces (see Figure 1), and were
first asked to choose which face was most similar to the neutral
face depicted on top. Subsequently, participants ranked the faces
in order of similarity as in Study 1a.
Results
Categorization task. Similar to Tversky (1977) and Study 1a, a
large proportion of the participants (66/75, 88%) in condition
1The first category therefore consisted of the 3 possible rankings {b>p>c,
p>b>c, and b>c>p}, the second category consisted of the 3 possible rankings
{c>p>b, p>c>b, and c>b>p}.
2One participant did not fully complete the ranking measure.
3Due to an error, only 200 participants were collected in Study 1b, rather than
the planned 250. This means power was slightly lower than intended.
1 grouped the smiling faces (p and c) together, and grouped the
neutral face (a) together with the frowning face (b). In condition
2, a large proportion of the participants (64/72, 88.9%) grouped
the frowning faces (b and p), and the neutral and smiling face (a
and c) together.
Similarity task. The similarity task consisted of two parts. First,
participants indicated which face in the bottom row was most
similar to the neutral face (a) presented on top. Subsequently,
participants ranked the faces in the bottom row in order of
most similar to least similar to the face on top. Participants
in condition 1 were expected to be more likely to indicate the
neutral face (a) being similar to the frowning face (b) as com-
pared to participants in condition 2, and this was indeed the
case (41/93 in condition 1, 33/109 in condition 2, diagnostic-
ity effect = 13.81%, χ2(1, N = 202) = 4.12, p = 0.04, Cramer’s V =
0.143. Similarly, participants in condition 2 were expected to be
more likely to indicate the smiling face (c) to be more similar
to the neutral face (a) as compared to participants in condi-
tion 1, which also was confirmed (74/109 in condition 2, 42/93
in condition 1, diagnosticity effect 22.73%, χ2(1, N = 202) = 10.6,
p = 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.229.
To investigate how much of this shift can be explained by
a substitution effect, we also analyzed the rankings. Similar
to Study 1a, rankings were recoded into either indicating that
the frowning face (b) was more similar to the neutral face (a)
than the smiling face (c), or indicating that the smiling face
(c) was more similar to the neutral face (a) than the frown-
ing face (b). In the first condition, 47/93 participants judged
the sad face (b) as more similar to the neutral face (a) than
the smiling face (c). In the second condition, only 35/106 par-
ticipants did so4. This reduced, but did not eliminate the diag-
nosticity effect; 17.52%, χ2(1, N = 199) = 6.28, p = 0.01, Cramer’s
V = 0.178. In other words, if we directly replicate the analysis
by Tversky (1977) on our data, we find evidence consistent with
his original findings. Eliminating a confounding factor present
in the original study reduces the effect but still provides evi-
dence for a diagnosticity effect. See Table 1 for an overview of all
results.
Where Study 1a does not seem to provide any support
for the existence of a diagnosticity effect, Study 1b provides
support for the diagnosticity effect, even when eliminating
substitution effects. The effect size is in the replication study
4Three participants did not correctly complete the ranking part.
Table 1 | Results Study 1a and 1b.
Sample Categorization Similarity Eliminating substitution
b(p) – b(q) (%) c(q) – c(p) (%) b(p) – b(q) (%) c(q) – c(p) (%) b > c(p) – b > c(q) (%)
Dutch students 74.82 65.88 −6.30 0.79 2.89
mTurk 86.49 91.89 13.81 22.73 17.52
The categorization and similarity results represent the difference (in percentages) in choices for targets b and c between the two conditions (p and q). The right
most column represents the average difference (in percentages) between the two conditions of the percentage of times option b was ranked higher than c. Results
in green are in the direction predicted by a diagnosticity effect, those in red are opposite to the expected direction.
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is smaller than the effect size in the original study reported
by Tversky (1977), who found a difference of 32% in choices
for b and 38% in choices for c, whereas we only found a
17.5% change in Study 1b, and a negative diagnosticity effect
of −2.9% in Study 1a. The results of Study 1 are therefore
inconclusive.
STUDY 2
In Study 2 we attempted to replicate Experiment 4 in Tversky and
Gati (1978) which was reported in Tversky (1977) as the second
study providing support for the diagnosticity effect. As in Study 1,
the original study consisted of two separate tasks. In the first task
participants were asked to categorize sets of countries, while in
the second task participants made similarity judgments for these
sets of countries.
Because the original study was conducted in the early 70’s,
the materials were slightly adjusted to accommodate for the
fact that some countries no longer exist (see Table 2 for
all stimuli). Since the theory behind the diagnosticity effect
predicts that the way stimuli are categorized into subsets
affects judgments of similarity, the first part of the experi-
ment examines whether the countries are categorized in dif-
ferent subsets, depending on the distractor stimulus that is
manipulated between conditions. Only when the inclusion
of a distractor country results in a different categorization
between conditions in the first categorization task (which can
thus be regarded as a manipulation check) is it expected that
this specific stimulus affects similarity judgments in the sec-
ond part. Two replication studies were performed, one with a




Categorization task. For the categorization task, 131 students
from Eindhoven University of Technology were approached on
the campus and presented with a small booklet in which 20
groups of four countries were displayed. Following Tversky and
Gati (1978) in each trial participants were asked to create two
different groups of countries. Similarly to Study 1, three of the
countries were the same across condition (a, b, & c) with a fourth
distractor country varying across conditions (p or q).
Similarity task. The similarity task was conducted at the social
psychology lab in Tilburg University (N = 198) and was the first
task in a series of unrelated experiments. Participants were pre-
sented with a booklet containing both judgment tasks. On the first
pages, 20 trials were printed in which the four countries were pre-
sented with country a on top, and three other countries (b, p/q, c)
at the bottom (see Figure 5A for an example trial). They were
Table 2 | Overview of categorization data in Study 2a and 2b.
Stimuli Sample
Countries(both versions) Distractor Dutch students mTurk
Trial a—Top b—Left c—Right p – cond. 1 q – cond. 2 b(p) – b(q) (%) c(q) – c(p) (%) b(p) – b(q) (%) c(q) – c(p) (%)
1 Russia Poland China India Hungary 71.05 69.53 68.47 43.97
2 England Iceland Belgium Switzerland Madagascar 20.00 30.77 27.04 20.77
3 Bulgaria Czech Republic Serbia Greece Poland 14.13 13.15 17.04 10.91
4 America Brazil Japan China Argentina 54.83 61.27 39.01 31.98
5 Cyprus Greece Crete Malta Turkey 13.66 36.18 8.64 10.70
6 Sweden Finland Netherlands Switzerland Iceland 17.93 19.51 8.15 12.09
7 Israel England Iran Syria France 46.15 81.56 54.46 83.10
8 Austria Sweden Hungary Poland Norway 49.39 57.18 25.57 45.23
9 Iran Turkey Kuwait Iraq Pakistan 6.15 16.92 −0.90 21.82
10 Japan China Germany America North-Korea 58.69 48.28 55.23 39.83
11 Uganda Libya Zaire Angola Algeria −2.75 29.95 11.92 19.51
12 England France Australia New-Zeeland Italy 77.20 77.23 50.49 31.05
13 Venezuela Colombia Iran Kuwait Brazil 74.08 33.24 80.24 24.91
14 Serbia Hungary Greece Turkey Poland 43.61 33.19 12.24 8.04
15 Libya Algeria Syria Jordan Tunis 14.22 26.60 25.75 25.85
16 China Russia India Indonesia America 45.17 45.31 17.49 8.82
17 France Germany Italy Spain England 57.20 39.30 45.26 12.89
18 Cuba Haiti North-Korea Albania Jamaica 24.69 9.67 37.56 11.99
19 Luxembourg Belgium Monaco San Marino Netherlands 67.95 64.97 52.16 28.82
20 Serbia Czech Republic Austria France Poland 40.48 19.60 15.85 7.18
The categorization and similarity results represent the difference (in percentages) of choices for that target b and c between the two conditions (p and q). The right
most column represents the average difference (in percentages) between the two conditions in the number of times option b was ranked higher than c. Results in
green are in the direction predicted by a diagnosticity effect, those in red are opposite to the expected direction.
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FIGURE 5 | (A) Example of a similarity-judgment trial completed by the Dutch participants in condition 1 (left) and condition 2 (right). (B) Example of a ranking
trial completed by Dutch participants in condition 1 (left) and condition 2 (right).
asked to indicate which country was most similar to the country
printed at the top. Subsequently, the 20 trials were presented a sec-
ond time, only now participants were asked to rank the countries
at the bottom in order of similarity to the country at the top (see
Figure 5B).
Results
Categorization task. It was expected that distractor country p
would be more likely to be grouped with c than distractor coun-
try q. In other words, in condition 1 it was expected that most
participants would categorize country a and b in one group, and
country p and c in the other group. In condition 2 it was expected
that participants would be more likely to categorize country a and
c together, and country b and q together. In 19 of the 20 trials, par-
ticipants were more likely to group a and b together in condition 1
as compared to condition 2. In all 20 trials, participants were more
likely to group country a and c together in condition 2 as com-
pared to condition 1 (see Table 2). Note that one trial (trial 11;
Uganda, Libya and Zaire with Angola or Algeria) did not show the
desired categorization effect on b. Because the diagnosticity effect
is theorized to be the result of influences of categorization on sim-
ilarity judgments, a lack of a categorization effect is the equivalent
of a failed manipulation check, and means no diagnosticity effect
is expected.
Similarity task. Judgments of similarity were expected to fol-
low the categorization task, such that participants in condition 1
would be more likely to indicate country b was similar to country
a as compared to participants in condition 2, while participants
in condition 2 would be more likely to indicate country c was
similar to country a as compared to participants in condition 1.
For clarity, we will refer to results in predicted direction a “pos-
itive” diagnosticity effect. Results showing an opposite pattern
from predictions will be referred to as “negative” diagnosticity
effects.
For the 19 trials testing for a diagnosticity effect on country
b, 12 showed a positive diagnosticity effect, 1 trial had an effect
of exactly 0, and 6 trials showed a negative diagnosticity effect
(opposite to predictions). The average effect across all 19 trials
was 5.6%. Effects for country c were similar, out of the 20 trials 13
showed a positive effect, 1 an effect of exactly 0, and 6 a negative
effect opposite to predictions, the average diagnosticity effect was
9.8%. Overall, the average diagnosticity effect was 7.79% (SD =
14.10), t(38) = 3.45, p = 0.001, gav = 0.31, 95% CI [0.12, 0.50],
JZS BF10 = 19.77.
These findings, however, could be the result of a mere sub-
stitution effect. Similar to Study 1, rank orders were categorized
as either indicating country b was more similar to country a
(at the top) than country c was to country a, or the other way
around5. In other words, participants were categorized as either
placing country b higher in the ranking than country c, or ranking
country c higher than country b. Eliminating substitution-effects
resulted in no indication of a diagnosticity effect (see Table 2).
Out of 19 trials, 12 showed a negative effect of categoriza-
tion and 7 a positive effect. Overall the effect of categorization
was −1.21% (SD = 6.04), t(18) = −0.87, p = 0.40, gav = −0.05,
95% CI [−0.15, 0.06], JZS BF10 = 0.25. This means that partic-
ipants were slightly less likely (but not significantly so) to rank
country b above country c in in condition 1 as compared to con-
dition 2. For an overview of the similarity judgments, see Table 3.
STUDY 2b
Method
For the categorization task, 153 workers on Amazon mTurk com-
pleted 20 trials similar to those in Study 2a, but translated into
English.
5The first category therefore consisted of the 3 possible rankings {b>p>c,
p>b>c, and b>c>p}, the second category consisted of the 3 possible rankings
{c>p>b, p>c>b, and c>b>p}.
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Table 3 | Results Study 2a.
Categorization Similarity Eliminating substitution
Trial b(p) – b(q) (%) c(q) – c(p) (%) b(p) – b(q) (%) c(q) – c(p) (%) b > c(p) – b > c(q) (%)
1 69.42 70.93 0.00 −7.07 −4.68
2 19.28 31.35 −5.05 29.29 2.02
3 13.36 14.34 4.04 −4.04 −7.07
4 52.96 63.50 −2.02 11.11 −3.59
5 10.37 36.95 −4.04 29.29 −10.10
6 15.66 20.19 −11.07 −7.05 −7.07
7 45.45 83.33 6.06 54.55 6.00
8 48.32 58.86 19.94 −1.63 −8.54
9 5.85 17.06 5.05 8.08 7.07
10 57.34 49.44 25.72 6.16 1.01
11 −3.36 31.12 −24.24 25.25 −13.13
12 75.48 8.51 1.62 14.57 5.05
13 72.49 3.94 13.23 0.00 −1.02
14 41.89 3.99 1.23 4.06 −1.96
15 13.26 8.37 9.82 13.58 4.04
16 43.38 6.29 19.52 16.38 12.12
17 55.78 0.09 −9.36 19.47 −1.45
18 24.17 1.70 26.80 −16.78 −8.08
19 66.41 6.34 −2.57 6.34 −3.70
20 37.18 0.05 8.18 −4.97 −3.00
Average 38.24 41.82 5.64 9.83 −1.21
The categorization and similarity results represent the difference in percentage selecting for that target between the two conditions (p and q). The right most column
represents the average difference (in percentages) between the two conditions in the number of times option b was ranked higher than c. Results in green are in
the direction predicted by a diagnosticity effect, those in red are opposite to the expected direction. Values with gray background are excluded when calculating the
average over trials.
The similarity task was completed by 201 different workers on
mTurk and consisted of 40 trials. The task was identical to Study
2a, except for the English translation.
Results
Categorization task. Similar to Study 2a, it was expected that
most participants would group country a and b together, as well
as group country p and c. In condition 2 it was expected that
participants would be more likely to group country a and c
together, as well as group country b and q. In condition 1, the
prediction was confirmed for 19 of the 20 trials (trial 9, Iran,
Turkey, Kuwait and Pakistan or Iraq did not show the expected
categorization effect on b, which was a different trial than in
Study 2a)6. For an overview of the categorization data, see Table 2.
In condition 2, participants were more likely to group country a
and c together in condition 2 as compared to condition 1 for all 20
trials. Since categorization did not show the desired effect for one
trial in condition 1, this trial will be excluded from subsequent
analyses.
6It is possible that trial 11 in study 2a and trial 9 in study 2b did not show the
intended categorization effect due to cultural differences. Alternatively since a
total of 40 categories had to be created in each study, this could also be a false
negative.
Similarity task. Based on the diagnosticity principle, it was pre-
dicted that participants would be more likely to indicate country
b was similar to the target (country a) in condition 1 as compared
to condition 2. Furthermore, it was predicted that participants in
condition 2 would be more likely to indicate country c was most
similar to country a. Results consistent with these predictions
are described as positive diagnosticity effects whereas those in
opposite direction are referred to as negative diagnosticity effects.
One trial did not show the required categorization effect on
country b. This is the equivalent of a failed manipulation check,
which means that for that trial no diagnosticity effect is predicted.
Therefore, only 19 trials were analyzed. In 12 of the 19 trials a
positive diagnosticity effect was found, while in 6 of the 19 trials
a negative diagnosticity effect was observed. The average diagnos-
ticity effect across all 19 trials was 1.2%. For country c, 13 of the 20
trials showed a positive diagnosticity effect, 6 a negative one. The
average effect across all 20 trials was 7.4%. Overall, there was some
indication of a diagnosticity effect of 4.4% (SD = 13.32), t(38) =
2.06, p = 0.046, gav = 0.24, 95% CI [0.00, 0.49], but this differ-
ence was not convincing when evaluated with Bayesian statistics,
JZS BF10 = 0.89.
To examine whether the diagnosticity effect was caused by a
substitution effect, we analyzed the rank orders following Medin
et al. (1995). Eliminating substitution reduced the differences
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between conditions. Out of 19 trials, 12 showed positive diag-
nosticity effect on similarity judgments (indicating people in
condition 1 were more likely to rank country b higher than
country c) and 7 showed a negative diagnosticity effect. Overall
the effect of categorization on similarity judgments was 1.24%
(SD = 6.50), t(18) = 0.83, p = 0.42, gav = 0.06, 95% CI [−0.09,
0.22], JZS BF10 = 0.24. This means that participants were slightly
more likely to rank country b above country c in condition 1
as compared to condition 2, but this difference was not statisti-
cally significant. For an overview of the similarity judgments, see
Table 4.
META-ANALYSIS
To evaluate the overall support for an effect on the similar-
ity task and the ranking task (which controls for substitution
effects) we performed two meta-analyses. For Studies 1a and 1b
we calculated odds ratios and transformed these to Cohen’s d fol-
lowing the recommendations by Borenstein et al. (2009). For the
two analyses of the similarity task in Study 1a and 1b (i.e., the
difference in choices for option b between conditions, and the dif-
ferences in choices for option c between conditions) a combined
effect size was calculated (with r = 1 for the variance calculations
because changes in one test are inextricably linked to the out-
come in the other test). For the similarity task in Study 2a and
2b Cohen’s d was calculated based on the difference in choices
for b and c depending on the distractor in each of the two con-
ditions (over the 39 difference scores). For the ranking task in
Study 2a and 2b Cohen’s d was calculated based on the change
in ranking (over the 19 difference scores). The analyses were per-
formed in R using the meta package (Schwarzer, 2007). The R
script and data for the meta-analysis are available from http://osf.
io/e6cr3/.
A random-effects meta-analysis of the similarity task revealed
an overall effect size of d = 0.23, 95% CI [0.02, 0.43] that
differed statistically from zero, p = 0.03, and some heterogene-
ity in the effect sizes Q(3) = 10.57, p = 0.01, τ2 = 0.03%, I2 =
71.6% (mainly due to the smaller effect size in Study 1a). This
means we replicate the pattern of results as observed by Tversky
(1977), although the size of the effect is substantially smaller
(see Figure 6, top pane). A random-effects meta-analysis of the
ranking task, which controls for substitution effects, revealed an
overall effect size of d = 0.09, 95% CI [−0.07, 0.25]. This effect
size did not differ statistically from zero, p = 0.26. There was
again heterogeneity in the effect sizes Q(3) = 10.38, p = 0.02,
τ2 = 0.02%, I2 = 71.1% (mainly due to the larger effect size in
Study 1b). This indicates that after controlling for substitution
effects, we did not observe support for a diagnosticity effect (see
Figure 6, bottom pane).
Table 4 | Results Study 2b.
Categorization Similarity Eliminating substitution
Trial b(p) – b(q) (%) c(q) – c(p) (%) b(p) – b(q) (%) c(q) – c(p) (%) b > c(p) – b > c(q) (%)
1 68.47 43.97 13.55 −8.58 3.89
2 27.04 20.77 −10.09 28.02 4.40
3 17.04 10.91 5.09 −3.20 6.01
4 39.01 31.98 −7.75 1.06 −10.16
5 8.64 10.70 −16.96 −7.61 −10.69
6 8.15 12.09 −9.12 16.63 0.46
7 54.46 83.10 4.05 40.56 1.01
8 25.57 45.23 1.76 −2.10 −6.78
9 −0.90 21.82 3.61 15.19 1.73
10 55.23 39.83 −7.73 28.53 0.11
11 11.92 19.51 −11.73 −2.28 6.06
12 50.49 31.05 3.05 8.65 8.15
13 80.24 24.91 28.58 −1.27 −0.54
14 12.24 8.04 −12.28 8.49 −0.79
15 25.75 25.85 0.47 7.38 6.21
16 17.49 8.82 −8.50 1.48 3.07
17 45.26 12.89 −2.60 2.92 2.90
18 37.56 11.99 18.70 1.77 −2.36
19 52.16 28.82 8.35 −2.80 −3.97
20 15.85 7.18 26.14 15.71 16.53
Average 32.58 24.97 1.21 7.43 1.24
The categorization and similarity results represent the difference (in percentages) in choices for targets b and c between the two conditions (p and q). The right
most column represents the average difference (in percentages) between the two conditions in the number of times option b was ranked higher than c. Results in
green are in the direction predicted by a diagnosticity effect, those in red are opposite to the expected direction. Values with gray background are excluded when
calculating the average over trials.
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FIGURE 6 | Forest plots for effect sizes (Cohen’s d) and their confidence intervals in Study 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b and the overall meta-analytic effect size
for the similarity task and the ranking task (controlling for substitution effects).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In four studies we examined the presence of a diagnosticity effect.
It was predicted that judgments of similarity would reflect choices
of categorization. This means that in all studies, participants in
condition 1 (e.g., with two frowning and one smiling face as
choice options) would judge item b (e.g., a smiling face) to be
more similar to the target (e.g., a neutral face) as compared to
participants in condition 2. Furthermore, participants in con-
dition 2 (e.g., with two smiling faces and one frowning face as
choice options) should judge item c (e.g., a frowning face) to
be more similar to a target than participants in condition 1 (see
Figure 1).
As in Tversky (1977) and Tversky and Gati (1978) we found
significant differences in similarity judgments as a function of
the distractor stimulus in Studies 1b, 2a, and 2b (but no effect
on similarity judgments in Study 1a). The results in Study 1b
are similar, though smaller than those found by Tversky (1977).
In Study 1b, we found a diagnosticity effect of 14% and 23%
(meaning that in condition 2, compared to condition 1, choice
for item b was decreased by 14% and choice for item c increased
by 23%). The effects originally reported by Tversky (1977) were
32% for b and 38% for c. The results of Study 2a, and 2b are
also very similar to those originally observed by Tversky and Gati
(1978), but again revealed smaller effects. In the original work,
Tversky and Gati (1978) found diagnosticity effects of approx-
imately 11.8% on choices for b and 11.6% on choices for c. In
our studies we found an effect of 5.6% and 1.2% on choices for
b (resp. study 2a and 2b) and 9.8% and 7.4% on choices for c.
As such, our experiments result in similar, but less strong, dif-
ferences in similarity judgments as in Tversky and Gati’s original
experiments (Tversky, 1977; Tversky and Gati, 1978). Thus, as the
meta-analysis indicates, without eliminating possible substitution
effects we replicate the original findings by Tversky (1977) and
Tversky and Gati (1978).
However, eliminating substitution effects strongly reduces the
observed differences between conditions with averages of 2.89%
(1a), 17.5% (1b), −1.21% (2a), and 1.24% (2b). Overall the size
of differences between conditions, when substitution effects were
eliminated, clustered around zero (see Figure 6). The results of
Study 1b may seem to be an exception to this overall pattern
by revealing a significant positive diagnosticity effect even after
substitution effects are eliminated. Although the observed effect
in Study 1b is surprising assuming that the null-hypothesis is
true, we have no clear explanation for the presence of an effect
in this single trial, but the absence of an effect in the other stud-
ies. The two most probable interpretations seem to be that the
diagnosticity effect does not exist and study 1b is a false posi-
tive, or that unknown moderators exist. We will now discuss these
possibilities.
One possible interpretation of these results is that Tversky’s
original findings on the diagnosticity principle are indeed con-
founded by a substitution effect. The diagnosticity principle is
only a part of the contrast model developed by Tversky (1977).
The main goal of Tversky’s (1977) work on similarity on context
was to demonstrate that subjective similarity judgments did not
always correspond to predictions made by geometrical models
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of similarity. He highlighted the role of context and attention in
similarity judgments, and the core of Tversky’s contrast model,
that the similarity between objects is expressed as a function of
their common and disjunctive features, remains a powerful idea
in cognitive psychology (for a review, see Goldstone and Son,
2005).
If we assume that diagnosticity effects do not exist, the differ-
ences found in Study 1b are surprisingly large. It could be the case
that categorization indeed influences judgments of similarity, but
that it does so in a more complex way suggesting that the model
needs to be adapted rather than rejected. As such, our findings are
relevant for more recent models of similarity that try to account
for the effects observed by Tversky (1977) in geometric models of
similarity (e.g., Pothos et al., 2013).
POTENTIAL MODERATORS
It is possible that diagnosticity has an effect on judgments of sim-
ilarity, but that its influence is more complex than previously
FIGURE 7 | Plot of diagnosticity effects found by Tversky (left column)
and those in Experiment 1, 2a, and 2b. Absolute differences are plotted
for Tversky’s data, for Study 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b the ranking-values
(eliminating substitution effects) are plotted.
believed. Two of these moderators (shared (mis)matches and
ranking vs. selecting) cannot explain the null-findings reported
in this manuscript. The third moderator (semantic vs. objec-
tive features) might. These three moderators are discussed
below.
Goldstone et al. (1997) tried to build on Tversky’s model by
making a distinction between shared matches and shared mis-
matches, and predicted that shared matches would lead to oppo-
site effects on judgments of similarity from shared mismatches. If
half of the trials in Study 2 contained of shared matches and the
other half of shared mismatches, this could possibly explain the
average effect of zero. Inspecting the data, this explanation seems
unlikely. As can be seen in Figure 7, the sizes of the diagnosticity
effect seems to be spread around zero rather than form two clus-
ters, one above zero (for the trials featuring a mismatch) and one
below (for the trials featuring a match).
Further evidence against this idea comes from the catego-
rization data. In the Dutch sample, all participants created only
groups of two countries. If the distractor country was perceived as
sharing a matching feature with the target and one of the choice-
options, participants would have created groups of three and one
instead of two groups of two. In the mTurk sample, participants
did on occasion create groups of three countries. However, this
grouping did not relate to the size and direction of the diag-
nosticity effect, the correlation between amount of participants
making clusters of three and the diagnosticity-effect was smaller
than 0.01, see supplementary materials on http://osf.io/e6cr3/.
Finally, if the distinction between shared matches and shared mis-
matches would explain the average effect of zero, this implies that
the effects should be consistent between Study 2a and 2b. As can
be seen in Figure 8, this does not seem to be the case.
It is also possible that forcing participants to rank the options
caused them to approach the similarity task in a different way.
Even though we cannot fully reject this possibility, it seems
unlikely that this is the case. Because participants first selected one
of the three stimuli, and subsequently rank-ordered all three stim-
uli, we can test for consistency in answers between their choice for
the most similar stimulus in the first part of the task, and the stim-
ulus rank-ordered as the most similar stimulus. As can be seen
in the supplementary materials, there were very few instances in
FIGURE 8 | Size of the diagnosticity effect for each individual trial (on the x-axis) for the students (in blue, studies 1a and 2a) and mTurk (in green,
studies 1b and 2b) samples.
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which participants did not rank their previous choice of being
most similar as number 1. One could of course argue that by
first completing the choice trials and then completing the rank-
ing trials, participants tried to be extra consistent. However, if
participants tried to be consistent this would increase the like-
lihood of finding a diagnosticity effect rather than decrease it.
Furthermore, Tversky(1977, p. 343) reports that changing the
similarity-judgments by asking participants to rank order the
options did not change his results. Note that those data were ana-
lyzed in the same way as the choice-studies (only analyzing the
item ranked as most similar rather than analyzing whether b was
ranked higher or lower than c) and did not eliminate substitution
as a confound.
The trials used in Experiment 1, and in conceptual replica-
tions by Medin et al. (1995) and Goldstone et al. (1997) were
all trials in which participants judged the stimuli on objectively
observable features such as the shape of a mouth or the size of a
triangle. The trials in Study 2 on the other hand used countries for
which participants were expected to create categories on the basis
of their subjective knowledge about the features of the countries.
It is possible that the automatic categorization that is supposed
to influence judgments of similarity only happens when partic-
ipants can directly see and compare these features. Because the
results presented in Tversky (1977) are confounded with substi-
tution effects, it is possible that he interpreted only a substitution
effect as evidence for diagnosticity in Study 2, using countries,
but that the results of Study 1, using faces, actually do (partially)
reflect a diagnosticity effect. This would also be consistent with
the findings by Tversky (1977) who, using the faces-task, found
such large differences in choices that even when a very conserva-
tive test that overcorrects for substitution effects is used, his data
still show significant differences in choice proportions (see page
6 in Medin et al., 1995 for a more extensive discussion) Since the
original study using the faces can readily be replicated, it would
be useful if more people would administer this experiment to
their participants (materials can be downloaded from http://osf.
io/e6cr3/) to see whether the effects replicate. The results could be
shared among researchers through for example psych file-drawer
and will allow the field as a whole to gain more insights in whether
and when diagnosticity effects emerge.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, in 42 trials spread over 4 studies we found
differences in choice proportion similar to those found by
Tversky (1977). After eliminating substitution effects as a pos-
sible confound, these effects largely disappeared. There are
two explanations that seem likely to explain this difference.
One possibility is that there really are no diagnosticity effects
and previously found differences have been substitution-effects
wrongfully interpreted as diagnosticity effects. The other expla-
nation could be that diagnosticity effects do exist but only in
situations where the features of the targets are visual and read-
ily available rather than dependent on subjective and semantic
knowledge.
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